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The contribution of managed care to the performance of
healthcare systems - evidence from three countries
Abstract
This paper applies the five standard economic performance criteria to gauge the contribu-tion of
Managed Care (MC) to the performance of three healthcare systems, viz. Germany, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland. The criteria are (1) matching of consumer preferences, (2) technical efficiency, (3) adaptive
capacity, (4) dynamic efficiency, and (5) a rent-free distribution of income that provides incentives for
producers to attain criteria (1) through (4). Being insurance-based, the German, Dutch, and Swiss
healthcare systems comprise three contractual relationships that can be judged in the light of these
criteria. The maximum contribution of MC to the performance of the healthcare system is found for the
Netherlands followed by Switzerland. The Independent Practice Associations rep-resenting MC in the
Netherlands, and the Health Maintenance Organizations representing MC in Switzerland score 15
respectively 6 out of 30 points. By way of contrast, the con-tribution of the Disease Management
Programs to the performance of the German health-care system remains limited (3 out of 30 points).
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1. Introduction
Healthcare expenditure (HCE) continues to increase at a faster rate than GDP 
in almost all industrialized countries. Governments have tried to alleviate the 
pressure on their budget1 mainly in two different ways. One has been to limit 
HCE by regulation, the other, to introduce competition in an attempt to increase 
efficiency (Cutler 2002). Since the first option has not proved too successful, 
more and more countries are seeking ways to enhance competition, among them 
by fostering Managed Care (MC). By vertically integrating health insurance and 
healthcare provision, MC may improve the allocation of resources in healthcare 
while limiting HCE. Indeed, most of the current literature on MC focuses on 
its impact on HCE.
Based on the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, Manning et al. (1984) 
studied the effect of MC on the utilization of healthcare services and on the 
level of HCE. They had randomly assigned a group of 1,580 persons to receive 
care free of charge from either a fee-for-service physician of their choice (repre-
senting conventional care) or a physician participating in a Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO, representing MC). In addition, a group of 733 individu-
als, already enrolled in a HMO, constituted a control group. The crucial inno-
vation of this study was that participants were assigned to plans, which served to 
avoid risk selection effects, causing healthier individuals to enrol in MC plans. 
Both groups enrolled in the MC plan had 40 percent fewer inpatient admission 
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levels than those assigned to the conventional insurance plan. Their total HCE 
was about 25 percent lower than under conventional care.
Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse (2000) analyzed the effect of MC on 
the cost of treatment of one particular disease. They compared the treatment 
of heart disease in Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and traditional 
insurance plans using two datasets from Massachusetts. For the HMOs they 
found 30 to 40 percent lower HCE than for traditional plans, mainly due to dif-
ferences in unit prices. They concluded that MC may yield substantial increases 
in measured productivity relative to traditional insurance. Using Swiss panel data, 
Lehmann and Zweifel (2004) were able to distinguish cost savings due to risk 
selection and due to innovation effects. They found some evidence of risk selec-
tion effects, which however, accounted for only one-third of the cost advantage 
in the case of HMOs, with the remainder attributed to innovation effects.
This paper follows a more comprehensive (but more descriptive) approach by 
assessing the contribution of MC to the performance of an entire healthcare system. 
Performance is measured using five standard criteria developed for the assessment 
of an economy. They are (1) matching of consumer preferences, (2) technical effi-
ciency, (3) adaptive capacity, (4) dynamic efficiency, and (5) a rent-free distribution 
of income that provides incentives for producers to attain criteria (1) through (4). 
These criteria are applied to the three contractual relationships typically charac-
terizing a healthcare system, viz. (a) between the insured and patients and health 
insurers (the government as it were in the case of National Health Service-type 
systems); (b) between insurers (the government, respectively) and healthcare pro-
viders; and (c) between the insured and patients and healthcare providers.
The countries to be analyzed according to these five criteria and three contrac-
tual relationships are Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. This choice 
can be justified for the following reasons. First, all three are insurance-based, 
which facilitates the comparison. Second, elements of MC were introduced in 
all three countries during the last few years. Third, the Netherlands underwent 
an important reform of their healthcare system in 2006, which allows to test the 
hypothesis that the contribution of MC to system performance depends on the 
institutional framework.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the definition of MC 
and an explanation of the criteria for measuring performance. In section 3, these 
criteria are applied to the three contractual relationships of a healthcare system 
before the introduction of MC. Finally, the contribution of MC to the perform-
ance of the three healthcare systems is assessed in section 4 by applying the cri-
teria to the contractual relationships after the introduction of MC. The last sec-
tion presents a conclusion and suggestions for future work.
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2. Analytical Framework
2.1 The Common Building Block of Healthcare Systems  
and the Scope of Managed Care
The common building block of all healthcare systems is the relationship between 
the patient (the principal in the economic theory of contract) and the physician 
(the agent). Patients experience a significant informational disadvantage, caus-
ing them to delegate decision-making authority to the physician. In particular, 
they may at best observe the outcome of a treatment, but not physician effort. 
For the physician, however, additional effort is costly, at the very least in terms 
of leisure forgone. This fact alone prevents physicians from being a perfect agent 
of their patients. Generally, physicians will set their effort at a level they con-
sider optimal from their own point of view. Since it is in general impossible for 
the patient to find the payment function inducing the optimal treatment effort 
by the physician, there is scope for complementary agents who promise to mend 
the physician-patient relationship (Zweifel, 1998).
In Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland health insurers (in Germany 
medical associations as well) represent the dominant complementary agents. 
However, complementary agents induce new information asymmetries leading to 
moral hazard and adverse selection effects. Specifically, insured patients tend to 
consume more healthcare services than medically necessary. The objective of MC 
is therefore to rearrange the relationship between these three players in order to 
mitigate information asymmetries and enhance efficiency as well as to optimize 
the allocation of the healthcare resources used (Finsterwald, 2004).
Different forms of MC exist, including Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), and Independent Practice 
Associations (IPAs). They integrate insurance and provision of healthcare serv-
ices, however to a different extent. This integration is designed to reduce moral 
hazard effects between healthcare service provider and insurer, to optimize the 
use of healthcare resources (e.g. by avoiding double visits), and to better structure 
treatment processes. To this end, MC organizations listed above apply different 
instruments, such as selective contracting, gatekeeping, and disease management 
(Amelung, 2007; Felder, 2003).
In the following we will analyze the impact of MC on the performance of 
healthcare systems. The criteria used for evaluation are presented below.
SJES 3-2008.indb   481 18.08.2008   16:32:52
482 Schoder /  Zweifel
2.2 Evaluation Criteria
The five criteria listed below were originally developed for the assessment of an 
economy in general. Zweifel (2006) adapted them to the healthcare sector in 
the following way.
Matching of consumer preferences: Healthcare services should match the prefer-
ences of the insured, who are assumed to decide about the types of medical 
care that should be covered by insurance before they are ill.
Technical efficiency: The healthcare services that are provided according to crite-
rion (1) should be produced at least cost.
Adaptive capacity: The insured as well as insurers and healthcare providers should 
adapt e.g. to population ageing or to medical technical change.
Dynamic efficiency: The healthcare sector should have an optimal mix of product 
innovation (goods with changed characteristics that may fetch a higher price) 
and process innovation (unchanged goods at lower cost and price). In general, 
insurance-induced moral hazard biases this mix in favor of product innova-
tion (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997).
Income distribution according to performance: Providers of healthcare services 
should not be able to enjoy monopolistic rents (e.g. incomes that exceed the 
amount that is necessary to keep them in their current activity). Rents jeopard-
ize the attainment of the other four criteria because providers lack the incen-
tive to make the pertinent efforts.
These criteria are applied to the three contractual relationships characterizing 
a healthcare system defined in section 2.1. Each time, the issue is whether MC 
contributes to the improvement of the contractual relationship in the light of 
the five criteria.
3. The Contractual Relationships Prior to Managed Care  
in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland
First, the healthcare system of Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland will 
be described prior to MC using criteria (1) to (5). This is somewhat difficult for 
the Netherlands since some MC elements have been part of the healthcare system 
for a long time.
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2 Since more than 90 percent of the population is covered by the social insurance, the analysis 
performed below does not relate to the private health insurance sector.
3 Medical associations and health insurer associations distribute the budgeted amount propor-
tionally according to billed activity between the primary care physicians of a given land.
3.1 The Contractual Relationship between Consumers and Health Insurers
In all the three countries, consumers can choose among different health insurers. 
However, insurance policies are highly regulated. The government not only limits 
the range of admissible premiums (contribution rates, respectively in Germany), 
but also the treatments to be covered. Only in the Netherlands, cost-effective-
ness constitutes a criterion for the inclusion or exclusion of benefits (Schreyögg, 
Stargardt, Velasco-Garrido and Busse, 2005). Dutch and Swiss health 
insurers have more freedom to launch different types of insurance policies than 
their German counterparts (Schut and van de Ven, 2005; Becker, Brändle 
and Zweifel, 2007). In Germany, only private health insurers have the right to 
differentiate their products2 (Jacobs and Schulze, 2006).
Clearly, the obligation for health insurers to offer largely uniform insurance 
policies makes it difficult to match consumer preferences, to quickly adapt to 
changes of the economic environment, and to sustain technical and dynamic 
efficiency. Therefore, criteria (1) through (4) are violated (see Table 1). However, 
competition for consumers has been enough in the three countries to prevent the 
creation of rents [criterion (5)] (Zweifel, 2006).
3.2 The Contractual Relationship between Health Insurers  
and Healthcare Providers
In Germany and Switzerland, health insurers are subject to an ‘any-willing-pro-
vider’ clause, i.e. they are forced by law to contract with every approved physician. 
In the Netherlands, selective contracting has been possible since 1994; however, 
health insurers have been making very limited use of this right up to the present 
(Baur, Heimer and Wieseler, 2001). Health insurers also lack the right of nego-
tiating differentiated, incentive-compatible modes of physician remuneration in 
the countries analyzed. In Germany, the association of social health insurers and 
contract physicians negotiate both the global medical budget and the nation-
wide fee schedule3 (Busse, 2000). In the Netherlands, insurers have the choice 
between paying (primary care) physicians either fee-for-service or using capita-
tion (i.e. a fixed amount per enlisted patient). Swiss health insurers must apply 
Tarmed (Tarif médical), a nationwide fee schedule. For hospital services, German 
SJES 3-2008.indb   483 18.08.2008   16:32:52
484 Schoder /  Zweifel
health insurers are subject to a nationwide fee schedule (Pflegesatzverordnung). 
Dutch insurers have some negotiating leeway, which is however constrained in 
several ways. In Switzerland, they are confronted with cantonal hospital asso-
ciations. For pharmaceuticals, all three countries impose a national benefit list 
along with regulated prices.
Obviously, collective contracting and uniform payment schedules in Switzer-
land and Germany violate criteria (1), (2), and (5). However, criterion (2) is sat-
isfied to a higher degree in the Netherlands due to more flexibility with regard 
to modes of payments.
3.3 The Contractual Relationship between Consumers  
and Healthcare Providers
In Germany and Switzerland, patients can choose their preferred physicians 
without any limitation. In the Netherlands, they are obliged to see a primary 
care physician first, which may not be in accordance with consumer preferences 
[criterion (1)].
Table 1 summarizes the rough overall assessment of the German, Dutch, and 
Swiss healthcare system prior to MC.
Table 1: Main Violations of Performance Criteria Prior to MC
Consumers-Insurers Insurers-Providers Consumers-Providers
Germany criteria (1) through (4) criteria (1), (2), and (5) criterion (2)
Netherlands criteria (1) through (4) criteria (1) and (5) criterion (1)
Switzerland criteria (1) through (4) criteria (1), (2), and (5) criterion (2)
4. Assessing the Contribution of Managed Care to the Performance 
of the German, Dutch, and Swiss Healthcare Systems
This section is devoted to an assessment of the contribution MC makes to the 
performance of the German, Dutch, and Swiss healthcare systems. The scales 
used will be 2 points if MC fully contributes to the attainment of the criterion, 
1 point if MC partially contributes, and 0 points if it does not contribute to the 
attainment of the criterion. Points will be simply added to obtain a total score. 
For each country, the assessment focuses on the MC element that is most promi-
nent, e.g. Disease Management Programs in the case of Germany.
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4 Therefore, MC is known as integrated care (integrierte Versorgung) in Germany.
5 In Germany statutory sickness funds act as social health insurers.
6 The risk adjustment scheme is currently based on age, sex, gender, and the four DMPs offi-
cially implemented.
4.1 The Contribution of Disease Management Programs to the Performance  
of the German Healthcare System
The Laws on Health Insurance of 2000 and 2004 paved the way for MC in 
Germany (Bmj, 2006). The governments’ objective is to foster the integration 
of hitherto strictly separated ambulatory and hospital care.4 In the MC setting, 
sickness funds5 are allowed to selectively contract with physicians without the 
involvement of medical associations. Moreover, alternative forms of payment, 
including capitation can be implemented. The government promotes three dif-
ferent types of MC in particular, viz. Medical Care Centers (Medizinische Versor-
gungszentren), Independent Practice Associations (Hausarztmodelle), and Disease 
Management Programs (Strukturierte Behandlungsprogramme) (Greiner, 2005; 
Busse, 2004).
The effects of MC will be illustrated for the Disease Management Programs 
(DMPs). They have been developed to improve quality and cost-effectiveness 
of treatment received by the chronically ill. So far the government has defined 
DMPs for four chronic diseases, diabetes, breast cancer, asthma, and coronary 
heart disease. The sickness funds receive payments out of the risk adjustment 
scheme6 for every individual enrolled in a DMP (Bmg, 2007; Wiechmann, 
2003). It was hoped that connecting DMPs with the risk adjustment scheme 
would provide a stimulus for sickness funds to attract chronically ill people rather 
than eschewing them as high risks.
Relationship between Consumers and Insurers
Preferences of patients are not considered in the definition of DMPs. However, 
participation in DMPs is not mandatory but offers an additional choice. There-
fore matching of consumer preferences is slightly improved. There is little reason 
to expect that the chronically ill will obtain their treatment at lower cost because 
the DMPs do not provide incentives to health insurers or providers for a better 
coordination of care. Therefore, static efficiency is not enhanced. The Govern-
ment determines the design of DMPs, e.g. it decides (using lengthy procedures) 
which chronic diseases are included. This does not improve adaptive capacity 
of the system. However, sickness funds have incentives to support cost-reducing 
process innovation because the payment of the risk adjustment scheme is fixed, 
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putting them at risk for exclusive cost of treatment. This serves to redress the bal-
ance between product and process innovation somewhat. These considerations 
may justify the entries in the second column of Table 2.
Relationship between Insurers and Providers
Thanks to selective contracting, sickness funds are supposed to become prudent 
purchasers on behalf of their clients. One would expect them to contract only 
with those physicians exhibiting a favorable cost-benefit ratio in treatment of 
chronic illness. However, physicians participating in DMPs lose their autonomy 
in medical decision-making. Beside many other regulations, they must follow 
treatment guidelines and document the whole treatment process electronically. 
On the whole, DMPs are unattractive to physicians, who continue to have the 
option of billing fee-for-service. Therefore the DMPs do little to increase the 
degree of competition between healthcare providers and hence to improve the 
matching of consumer preferences, technical efficiency, adaptive capacity, or the 
avoidance of monopolistic rents. At least, the DMP guidelines may induce pro-
viders to focus more on process innovation, motivating the entry + 1 for criterion 
(4) in the second column of Table 2.
Relationship between Consumers and Physicians
In general, German consumers have a free choice of physicians but are expected 
to visit the hospital recommended by their primary care physician. However, 
usually primary care physicians place no restrictions on the hospital choice (Bmj, 
2006). In contrast, DMP-patients are constrained to select a participating phy-
sician. This limitation is hardly compensated; in particular, there is almost no 
reduction in the rate of contribution. But at least consumers are not forced to par-
ticipate, justifying the zero entry for criterion (1) in the third column of Table 2. 
Likewise, attainment of criteria (2) through (5) remains unchanged.
In sum, the contribution of DMPs to the performance of the German healthcare 
system remains limited (3 out of 30 points, see the last column of Table 2). The 
main violations of the criteria prior to the introduction of MC (see the shaded fields 
in Table 2) could not be offset, except for the criteria (1) and (4) relating to the rela-
tionship between consumers and insurers. This limited contribution is mainly due 
to comprehensive and uniform regulation stifling any innovative action by sickness 
funds. For the same reason, selective contracting does not produce the expected 
benefits for consumers. Thus, DMPs fail their main objective, viz. improved coor-
dination and quality of treatment provided to the chronically ill.
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4.2 The Contribution of the Independent Practice Association  
to the Performance of the Dutch Healthcare System
The Dutch government implemented radical market reforms with the Health-
care Act of 2006, the main objective being to increase efficiency by promoting 
competition in all three contractual relationships. The Act created a level play-
ing field between private and social health insurers, who converted to for-profit 
status. By March 2006, every Dutch citizen had to explicitly choose an insurer 
and a policy. Competitive pressure is expected to make better use of already 
existing MC tools, viz. selective contracting and gatekeeping. In contrast to their 
German and Swiss counterparts, Dutch health insurers can selectively contract 
with physicians (and, to a far more limited extent, hospitals). Gatekeeping, requir-
ing patients to first contract their primary care physician, was also established 
practice prior to the 2006 reform.
The effects of MC will be discussed focusing on the Independent Practice 
Association (IPA). The IPA is a network of primary care physicians who agree to 
act as gatekeepers. The main objective is to use medical care efficiently, e.g. by 
preventing unnecessary hospitalisations (Douven, Mot and Pomp 2007; Exter, 
Hermans, Dosljak and Busse, 2004).
Table 2: Contribution to Performance of DMPs in Germany
 Contractual 
 relationship
Criteria 
Consumers-
Insurers
(1)
Insurers-
Providers
(2)
Consumers-
Providers
(3)
S (max =  
6 per item)
(4)
(1) Matching of consumer 
preferences
1 0 0 1
(2) Technical efficiency 0 0 0 0
(3) Adaptive capacity 0 0 0 0
(4) Dynamic efficiency 1 1 0 2
(5) Income distribution 
according .to performance
0 0 0 0
.S (max = 10 per item) 2 1 0 3
0 = No change; 2 = improvement; 1 = partial improvement. 
Shaded field = MC helps to alleviate a shortcoming noted in Table 1.
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Relationship between Consumers and Insurers
An IPA might endanger the matching of consumer preferences since patients 
have to visit a primary care physician first. However, health insurers are more 
likely to become prudent purchasers on behalf of their costumers, using their 
freedom to contract with physicians who match the preferences of their mem-
bers. Competition for customers also forces health insurers to pass on savings 
to their clients and to adapt quickly to changes of the economic environment. 
These considerations justify the positive entries for criteria (1) through (3) in the 
first column of Table 3. In contrast, dynamic efficiency and income distribution 
according to performance are not attained to a higher degree because the mix 
between product and process innovation and provider competition for patients 
remains unchanged.
Relationship between Insurers and Healthcare Providers
Profit-maximizing health insurers seem to be at a first glance only interested in 
providers that keep down cost. However, they need to contract with providers 
who respect patient preferences to be successful since customers can switch insur-
ers. Insurers’ freedom to contract exposes physicians to an increased intensity of 
competition. Because physicians do not have the alternative of contracting out-
side the IPA (unlike in Germany and Switzerland), freedom to contract clearly 
serves to enhance technical efficiency. Moreover, beside cost competition there is 
still scope for quality competition, making physicians adapt quickly to changes 
of the economic environment [criterion (3)]. They are also more inclined to adopt 
cost-saving process innovation since many are paid a capitation, shifting the risk 
of high treatment cost on their shoulders. Finally, physicians with an unfavorable 
cost-benefit ratio have difficulty striking contracts with insurers. On the whole, 
these considerations motivate the entries of the second column in Table 3.
Relationship between Consumers and Healthcare Providers
Dutch patients do not have direct access to specialists. The restriction to see the 
gatekeeper first clearly is not compatible with a matching of consumer prefer-
ences. On the other hand, it does enhance technical efficiency by a more coor-
dinated treatment process, e.g. by avoiding double visits. Since the guidelines are 
voluntary, physicians can increase their chances by adopting them, increasing 
the adaptive capacity of the system. However, the IPA does not contribute to an 
increased satisfaction of criteria (4) and (5).
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Table 3: Contribution to Performance of the IPA in the Netherlands
 Contractual 
 relationship
Criteria 
Consumers-
Insurers
(1)
Insurers-
Providers
(2)
Consumers-
Providers
(3)
S (max =  
6 per item)
(4)
(1) Matching of consumer 
preferences
1 1 0 2
(2) Technical efficiency 2 2 2 6
(3) Adaptive capacity 2 1 1 4
(4) Dynamic efficiency 0 1 0 1
(5) Income distribution 
according .to performance
0 2 0 2
.S (max = 10 per item) 5 7 3 15
0 = No change; 2 = improvement; 1 = partial improvement. 
Shaded field = MC helps to alleviate a shortcoming noted in Table 1.
In all, the IPA of the Netherlands achieves 15 out of 30 points and therefore con-
tributes considerably to a higher performance of the Dutch healthcare system. 
Especially the criteria violated prior to the introduction of MC are now satisfied 
to a higher degree (see the shaded fields in Table 3). These are criteria (1) through 
(3) in the relationship between consumers and insurers and criteria (1) and (5) in 
the relationship between insurers and providers. The highest score comes from 
the relationship between insurers and healthcare providers (7 out of 10 points). 
Among the five criteria, technical efficiency benefits most, mainly due to selec-
tive contracting (6 out of 6 points). Apparently, the changed institutional setting 
of the Dutch healthcare system causes the contribution of MC to performance 
to be higher than the institutional setting of Germany.
4.3 The Contribution of Health Maintenance Organizations  
to the Performance of the Swiss Healthcare System
The new Law on social health insurance (KVG), effective 1996, established MC 
options, which had been introduced to the Swiss healthcare system since 1993. It 
enables health insurers to selectively contract with physicians (but not hospitals 
for the mandatory basic package). The MC alternatives offered include physician 
networks (similar to the afore-mentioned IPAs), Preferred Provider Organizations 
(PPOs), and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).
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In the following, focus will be on the HMOs when discussing the effects of 
MC on the performance of the Swiss healthcare system. The typical Swiss HMO 
takes the form of capitated local group practices, with physicians as salaried 
employees (Lehmann and Zweifel, 2004).
Relationship between Consumers and Health Insurers
In Switzerland, HMOs constitute an alternative to conventional fee-for-service 
policies. They allow consumers to voluntary limit their choice of physician in 
exchange for a lower insurance premium. However, government regulation pre-
vents the premium reduction from exceeding 20 percent for the first five years of 
contract life. This is not sufficient for the average Swiss consumer since market 
experiments show that restrictions of the freedom of physician choice have to be 
compensated with one-third of average premium (Zweifel, Telser and Vater-
laus, 2006). The expression of individual preferences therefore is not quite per-
fect (see entry in the first column of Table 4). Swiss HMOs do provide healthcare 
services at up to 63 percent lower cost than conventional fee-for-service. About 
one-third of the amount is due to risk selection effects, while two-thirds can be 
attributed to changed incentives (Lehman and Zweifel, 2004). This may jus-
tify the entry for criterion (2) in Table 4.
MC was also expected to foster product innovation in health insurance. How-
ever, prior to the introduction of MC, Swiss policy makers put a risk adjustment 
scheme in place. Such a scheme in fact punishes innovators, who at first inevita-
bly attract the mobile young. However, insurers with an above-average share of 
young enrollees must pay into the scheme. In this way, insurers adaptive capacity 
fails to be enhanced. Next, MC seems to have encouraged switching by consum-
ers to a rate of around 10 percent by 2006 (Bag, 2007). In their fight for market 
share, insurers can be expected to improve the cost-benefit ratio of their products, 
thus contributing to dynamic efficiency. However, with uniform premiums also 
imposed on MC alternatives, many insured are free to consume medical serv-
ices without any financial consequences, which is not compatible with a no-rent 
(net) income distribution. These considerations lead to the remaining entries in 
the first column of Table 4.
Relationship between Health Insurers and Healthcare Providers
Insurers’ obligation to contract with any willing provider is not compatible with a 
matching of consumer preferences, technical efficiency, and an income distribu-
tion devoid of rents. However, this ‘any-willing-provider’ clause is not applicable 
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to MC options that permit insurers to select physicians with a favorable cost-ben-
efit ratio. With only a small share of the population enrolled in MC alternatives 
(18 percent in 2006, one-third of which in HMOs; see BAG, 2007), physicians 
still can easily revert to conventional fee-for-service with its ‘any-willing-provider’ 
clause. Therefore, MC only partially enhances attainment of criteria (1), (2), and 
(4) while not affecting adaptive capacity [criterion (3)] and rent-free income dis-
tribution [criterion (5)].
Table 4: Contribution to Performance of HMOs in Switzerland 
 Contractual 
 relationship
Criteria 
Consumers-
Insurers
(1)
Insurers-
Providers
(2)
Consumers-
Providers
(3)
S (max =  
6 per item)
(4)
(1) Matching of consumer 
preferences
1 1 0 2
(2) Technical efficiency 1 1 0 2
(3) Adaptive capacity 0 0 0 0
(4) Dynamic efficiency 1 0 0 1
(5) Income distribution 
according .to performance
0 1 0 1
.S (max = 10 per item) 3 3 0 6
Relationship between Consumers and Healthcare Providers
Consumers signing up for a HMO accept limited physician choice. However, 
they do this voluntarily. As long as MC is not the dominant type of healthcare 
provision, criterion (1) is not violated. The remaining criteria (2) through (5) are 
not affected, mainly because patients were able to choose their physicians freely 
prior to MC. Their choice of hospital is restricted to the canton of residence 
(except if covered by supplementary insurance), and MC has not changed this.
In all, Swiss HMOs contribute to a higher performance of the Swiss health-
care system (6 out of 30 points, see Table 4 below). As for the Netherlands, main 
improvements are found especially for previously violated criteria (see the shaded 
fields in Table 4). These are criteria (1), (2), and (4) for the relationship between 
consumers and insurers and criteria (1), (2), and (5) for the relationship between 
insurers and physicians. Matching of consumer preferences and technical effi-
ciency [criteria (1) and (2)] benefit most of the introduction of MC. However, 
government regulation such as the ‘any-willing-provider’ clause in conventional 
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medicine and for hospitals, prevent MC from making a more substantial contri-
bution to the Swiss healthcare system.
5. Conclusion
This article proposes an innovative approach to analyze the impact of MC on 
healthcare systems. Rather than just analyzing the effects of MC on HCE, it con-
siders economic criteria, viz. matching of consumer preferences, adaptive capacity, 
dynamic efficiency, and income distribution according to performance, which 
determine the performance of a healthcare system.
The contribution of MC to the performance of the German healthcare system 
remains limited (3 out of 30 points). The DMPs, designed to improve the quality 
and cost-effectiveness of treatments for chronically ill people, cannot fulfill their 
expectations. Government regulation such as the uniform design of the DMPs, 
the bureaucratic requirements for physicians, and the loss of free physician choice 
without adequate compensation, prevent DMPs from making a substantial con-
tribution to the German healthcare system.
In the Netherlands, MC contributes considerably to a higher performance of 
the Dutch healthcare system (15 out of 30 points). MC together with the Health-
care Act of 2006 liberalized the relationship between health insurers and health-
care service providers, making health insurers prudent purchasers of healthcare 
services on behalf of their clients. Therefore the main improvements are found for 
the relationship between health insurers and healthcare service providers (7 out of 
10 points) and for the second criterion, technical efficiency (6 out of 6 points).
In Switzerland, MC contributes to a higher performance of the healthcare 
system, but to a lower degree than in the Netherlands (6 out of 30 points). 
Improvements are found for the relationships between consumers and health 
insurers, and health insures and healthcare service providers (both 3 out of 10 
points). Among the five criteria, matching of consumer preferences [criterion 
(1)] and technical efficiency [criterion (2)] receive the highest score (2 out of 6). 
However, regulations such as the limit on the premium reduction for MC plans, 
the uniform benefit package, or the ‘any-willing-provider’ clause governing the 
relationship between health insurer and healthcare provider, prevent MC from 
making a more substantial contribution to the Swiss healthcare system.
Finally, the findings suggest that MC may depend on the institutional set-
ting. The more freedom to contract between consumers, health insurers, and 
healthcare service providers, the greater the contribution of MC to the healthcare 
system. However, further research is necessary to test this hypothesis.
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SUMMARY
This paper applies the five standard economic performance criteria to gauge the 
contribution of Managed Care (MC) to the performance of three healthcare 
systems, viz. Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The criteria are (1) 
matching of consumer preferences, (2) technical efficiency, (3) adaptive capac-
ity, (4) dynamic efficiency, and (5) a rent-free distribution of income that pro-
vides incentives for producers to attain criteria (1) through (4). Being insur-
ance-based, the German, Dutch, and Swiss healthcare systems comprise three 
contractual relationships that can be judged in the light of these criteria. The 
maximum contribution of MC to the performance of the healthcare system is 
found for the Netherlands followed by Switzerland. The Independent Practice 
Associations representing MC in the Netherlands, and the Health Maintenance 
Organizations representing MC in Switzerland score 15 respectively 6 out of 30 
points. By way of contrast, the contribution of the Disease Management Pro-
grams to the performance of the German healthcare system remains limited (3 
out of 30 points).
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